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Friedrich Nietzsche --- Prophet of Nazism?, continued . 10. 11. 12. 13. FOOTNOTES Brinton, C.C. Nietzsche. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1941. p. 209 Adler, R. “Speaking as One Superman to Another.” New York Times Magazine, October 17, 1943 Durant, Will. The Story of Philosophy. New York:...
Show moreFriedrich Nietzsche --- Prophet of Nazism?, continued . 10. 11. 12. 13. FOOTNOTES Brinton, C.C. Nietzsche. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1941. p. 209 Adler, R. “Speaking as One Superman to Another.” New York Times Magazine, October 17, 1943 Durant, Will. The Story of Philosophy. New York: Garden City, 1943 p. 301 Nietzsche. Geneology of Morals, “People and Countries” 14, 17; The Will to Power, 912; Zarathustra, IJ, 10. Twilight of the Idols, “Skirmishes in a War with the Age,” 39,38 Geneology of Morals, I, 11. Matthew 27:5; Luke 10:37 Beyond Good and Evil, “Peoples and Countries,” 251. Geneology of Morals, “Peoples and Countries,” 17. Ellis, Havelock. Affirmations. Boston: 1916. P. xii Messer, A. “Nietzsche und der Militarismus.” Frankfurter Zeitung, October 15, 1914. Quoted in Brinton, p. 203. Zarathustra, I, 1. Niebuhr, R. Faith and History. Hew York: Scribner, 1949. P. 116 BIBLIOGRAPHY “Adler, R. “Speaking as One Superman to Another.” New York Times Magazine, October 17,1943. Brinton, C.C. Nietzsche. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1941. _ Ellis, Havelock. Affirmations. Boston: 1916. Jaspers, Karl. Nietzsche und das Christentum. Hameln: F. Seifert, 1939. Junger, F.G. Nietzsche. Frankfurt am Main: Klostermann, 1949. Lavin, Janko. Nietzsche. London: Mathuen, 1948. Lionsbach, R.M. Nietzsche und die Juden. Stockholm: Bermann-Fischer, 1939. Mann, Thomas. Nietzsche’s Philosophy in the Light of Contemporary Events. Washington: Library of Congress, 1947. Nietzsche, Fredrich. The Philosophy of Nietzsche. New York: Modern Library. 119
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Towards a Concept of Man The General topic with which this paper is concerned is the concept of man in some sense as seen from the view- point of philosophy. It is clear that, as an individual, I cannot pretend to speak for philosophy in general, since by nature philosophy is a vast and...
Show moreTowards a Concept of Man The General topic with which this paper is concerned is the concept of man in some sense as seen from the view- point of philosophy. It is clear that, as an individual, I cannot pretend to speak for philosophy in general, since by nature philosophy is a vast and heterogeneous field in which -we find numerous points of view. Neither is it to be supposed that I speak in any sense for the department of philosophy, since it is quite possible that Mr. Hong or Mr. Davies will take violent exception to -what I have to say. By the same token, I should like it understood that my remarks are in no sense directed to the members of the other two departments represented here. It is the nature of philosophy to be critical, and therefore it is inevitable that this paper will be critical in some respects of psychology and sociology in generals but I do not wish to imply that the viewpoints of -which I am here attempt- ing an examination are necessarily these of the respective departments of St. Olaf College. Rather, I should like to center these few remarks around what I take to be the dominant, but not exclusive, trends in these disciplines at the present time. Philosophy ought not to be critical merely for the sake of being critical. Rather, in this case our interest lies in finding some common ground upon which our various disciplines can begin to work out a com- prehensive and satisfactory account of the nature of man. From this point of view, then, what we are interested in here is an adequate philosophy of man. But what might this be? It is clear that in order to be really adequate, a philosophy must not only be mutually consistent, or cor- respondent with only a part of human experience but must be an adequate instrument for interpreting all ranges of experience. And it is just this that the social sciences in general have failed to give us, for by virtue of their ‘method and by ignoring a rather large aspect of human experience in placing exclusive emphasis on those aspects of man and his society that may be neatly defined and described with a minimum of effort, they have destroyed one of man's most cherished possessions, his belief in the objectivity of value judgements. I am convinced that value judgments have real and not merely emotive meaning, and I am disturbed by the general tendency among social scientists to deny the reality of values in the interest of making the behavior of man as an individual or in society neatly and categorically predictable. In the interest of simplicity of method and public verifiability the social scientists have removed from scientific respectability the subjective and introspective aspects of man's expe- rience, and in doing so they have made it impossible for themselves to afford an adequate interpretation of the whole of man. It will be my contention here that such a method, while being undoubtedly justifiable on purely pragmatic grounds, cannot claim to be exhaustive or adequate to the task of providing a philosophy of man, but that an approach which can take cognizance of those orphaned areas of man's experience may, in spite of its methodological difficulties, make the objectivity of value judgements a tenable position, I believe it is quite accurate to state that the general trend in the social sciences today is toward a mechanistic, deterministic, naturalistic understanding of the nature of man. In the final analysis, this means that those aspects of life which we fondly and traditionally contend to be the very essence of mans such as the reality of the will and the objectivity of his moral and aesthetic judgements are relegated to the limbo of superstition and ignorance. For it is clear that if the actions or value judgements of any particular individual are to explained an the basis of antecedent events and if these actions in the life of man are related to his prior experience as events to causes in the same sense as the movement of a rifle bullet is related to the explosion of the powder in the barrel of the gun, it is nonsense to talk of any event as being self-caused or to speak of any moral choice as having the characteristic of guilt or virtue. In such a context, and this is in general the view of positivism or logical empiricism, the only meaning left to expressions of value, such as "murder is bad" is merely to say "murder-boo!"; and to say "charity is good" is to say no more than "charity--hurrah!" Thus the view is sometimes known as the "boo--hurrah!" theory of value. Why should this be so? Why is it that the social sciences tend to be deterministic when determinism appears to be destructive of moral value? It appears to me that this tendency in general is not consciously aimed at the destruction of value, but is made necessary by the attempt to make the social sciences into something akin to the natural sciences. In the early days of psychology, the introspective approach was held to be perfectly respectable, 120 .. .continued
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Symposium ¢ 1956, continued but as time went on it was discovered that the job of reporting introspective phenomena dad attempting to devise formulae for the prediction of human behavior on the basis of such data was a formidable one. As an example, you might sometime attempt to describe how a...
Show moreSymposium ¢ 1956, continued but as time went on it was discovered that the job of reporting introspective phenomena dad attempting to devise formulae for the prediction of human behavior on the basis of such data was a formidable one. As an example, you might sometime attempt to describe how a tooth-ache feels in terms other than a reference to other types of pain. Or again, you might try explaining the sensation of redness to someone who is color blind. You will find that to merely describe, much less explain "consciousness" in terms of such data a very difficult proposi- tion. As a result of this difficulty, and in the interest, of course, of making psychology as accurate a science as possible in terms of the prediction of behavior, the introspective, or if you prefer, the subjective approach gave way to the behavioristic approach, the attempt to explain human actions not in terms of how people feel at my given time but in terms of how they behave. Thus the behavioristic psychologist "explains" a tooth-ache not in terms of how one feels who has a tooth-ache, but in terms of how he behaves. No, clearly this is a much easier, and within the limits of the method, a much more productive approach than was that of introspection. For a definition of the scientific method, let me turn for a moment to the physicist, Albert Einstein. "Science," he says, "is the ... endeavor to bring together by means of systematic thought the perceptible phenomena of this world into as thorough going an association as possible.” Now there are few if any persons who would deny that this is a very laudable aim, and nobody can reasonable deny that the sciences, social as well as natural, have been enormously productive of tools and techniques for the good of man. Thus one is not entitled to deny an instrumental value in the sciences, but it is quite another thing to question the claim of any science to truth and particularly to exhaustive truth. And I am speaking here of truth in the traditional universal sense, not in the pragmatic, instrumental sense. We are generally inclined to think of physics as being an exemplary science, in that it is thoroughly mathematical and thoroughly dependable as far as the predictive value of its principles is concerned, but it does not require a very exhaustive knowledge of contemporary physics to know that even here all is not well within. For we find that the physicists are themselves divided into two schools of thought, one thoroughly deterministic and the other considerably less so. There are phenomena in physics, particularly in the field of the behavior of sub-atomic particles, which do not appear to be explainable on the basis of rigorous causality. For example, the so-called uncertainty relations of Heisenberg indicates that by the very nature of things it is logically impossible to hold to a principle of rigorous causality, for there exist phenomena which can- not be explained or measured on that basis. Likewise the occurrence of mutations in biology indicates on analy- sis that a concept of teleology, purposiveness in the development of the universe is perfectly tenable Thus, when we look to those sciences which are traditionally thought of as being thoroughly deterministic, we find that they are not and need not necessarily be so. And when we return again to the social sciences, we find that the assumption of a deterministic universe, which is essential to their use of the scientific method, is again not born out by the facts of experience. For consider, when I look within my own "consciousness" whatever that may be, or when I examine the self, I find that nothing seems more real than choice, that nothing seems to me, subjectively, more real than the value I attach to particular objects, persons, acts, or thoughts. When we ask what explanation the social scientists can give us of "purpose" we are told by one contemporary scientist that it means no more than this: that rats will learn a maze faster when given a reward of bran mash than they will when given a reward of sunflower seeds. And this is claimed to exhaust the meaning of purpose! A thoroughly deterministic approach to man rules out then, as it must in the interest of "practical" knowledge, the area of the subjective in his experience. And if we are at all sympathetic toward the aims of the social sci- ences, we must grant that this is right and proper, but only insofar as these disciplines themselves realize that in so doing they have divorced themselves in the interest of practicality of an area which might, in spite of its clear difficulties, afford a more comprehensive view of man. Consider a simple object like an orange, and suppose that we are desirous of understanding it. Since an orange has nothing analogous to what we might call "con- sciousness,” it is a fairly simple matter to define it as a particular complex of color, shape, texture, taste, odor, and ultimately chemical constituency. Now consider the case of a man. Clearly we may approach the problem in the same fashion, and discover than men in general share certain characteristics as to shape, chemical constituency _ and finally behavior, which is a new term that did not concern us when we considered the orange. Now I sub- mit that this is a perfectly respectable and legitimate method, and no doubt we have learned a great deal about men in this fashion, but the obvious question to ask at this juncture is "Is this all there is to the knowledge .. continued 121
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Symposium * 1956, continued or understanding of man?" If we say yes, we have espoused the rather distasteful conclusion that man is not to be distinguished from the animal, who likewise behaves in fairly regular patterns. This is the conclusion of the old German proverb: "Man is what he eats."...
Show moreSymposium * 1956, continued or understanding of man?" If we say yes, we have espoused the rather distasteful conclusion that man is not to be distinguished from the animal, who likewise behaves in fairly regular patterns. This is the conclusion of the old German proverb: "Man is what he eats." But after an examination of what I take to be consciousness, or the self, which includes the peculiarly persistent notion that at least in some particular instances what I do is not determined or explained by antecedent events, I find that Iam constrained to say "No, this is not all of man. There is yet something more." But if this is so, it remains to be asked what this something more may be, and how we may become aware of what its nature is. And these I concede are difficult problems. The Christian answer, of course, is that this "something more” is spirit, and that it can be known only through a revelation of God. The rational answer takes various forms, but is quite commonly that it is "consciousness" and that it can be known by something vari- ously entitled "intuition" or "direct awareness." And either view posits the existence of something which cannot be known by analysis, by sense experience no matter how refined our techniques or equipment may be, for spirit or consciousness are by definition outside the realm of those things which can be sensed. And it may be quite cogently argued that none of the social sciences, or the natural sciences for that matter, are without such an ele- ment for numerous constructs are made necessary by the fact that there are gaps in our knowledge which cannot be bridged by data afforded by our most refined scientific techniques. As an interesting example the concept of an unconscious mind in Freudian psychology is clearly an attempt to "explain" phenomena which do not easily fit into the usual pattern of behavior. But if the conscious mind is difficult to explain, the concept of an uncon- scious mind becomes even more difficult to understand or utilize. The psychologists may well argue that Freudian psychology is now "old hat," and perhaps it is, but this does not necessarily mean that the problems which occasioned the formation of the theory have been satisfactorily explained on some other basis. And there are many other examples of constructs used in the sciences, social and physical, which prove useful in the expla- nation of phenomena, but which are not themselves explainable by an empirical method. It is clear that in the short time allotted me I cannot hope to do any more than suggest that there may be an alter- native method that will provide us an adequate philosophy of man. That such a frame of reference is not only desirable but necessary is indicated, I believe, by the fact that the social scientists themselves find it impossible to remain within the bounds of their method. The more the social scientist insists that in terms of method his discipline is really one of the natural sciences, the more he constricts himself to an examination of those phenom- ena which are by nature subject to empirical test. When the scientist, for instance, denies the existence of mind because it cannot be seen or felt or examined in a test tube, or when on similar grounds he denies the objective existence of the spirit of man, he is no longer operating qua scientist because he has begun to make not scientific judgements but value judgements--that is, these concepts are ignored not because they can be proven false but because they do not appear to be immediately useful. But in such an event the scientist is no longer speaking qua scientist, because it is clear that whereas the empirical method can provide us with predictive knowledge of what will occur under certain conditions, such a method can never provide us with a knowledge of what man or his society ought to be. We cannot move directly from the "is" to the "ought" without the intervention of some- thing which is by nature non-empirical. When the sociologist insists that his discipline is a science and not thera- py, he is admitting by implication that within the limits of his method he can be concerned only with an exami- nation of how societies do in fact behave, and that there is no way for him as a scientist to get from the descrip- tive level to a judgement concerning how people in the mass ought to behave, or what the structure of society ought to be. The question of "oughtness" is by its very nature never a question of facts but of values. But if values are not to be found in the natural sciences, where might they be found? Many answers to the prob- lem have been proposed in the past, and many of them have been found to be unsatisfactory, for one reason or another. But I am convinced that it is neither rationally sound nor ethically just to consign the attempt to justify values on some non-scientific basis to the scrap-heap simply because the method has been found to include numerous and obstinate difficulties. Throughout the history of philosophy there runs the persistent them, even among the most violent critics of a religious or extra-empirical view, that man is not yet what he ought to be. And we might just as well admit that while the problem has persisted, there is no single answer that has proven common to all thinkers, for we find variously that man ought to be a superman, an aesthete, a cynic, a stoic, a mystic, and so on, but each view shares the conviction that man is not what he ought to be and is able to become. It would be obviously presumptuous of me to claim that I have solved the problem, but I do not think it either improvident or unjust for me to insist that the very persistence of the problem indicated that the ethical realm still stands as an independent discipline that cannot be reduced to science or semantics that in spite of the diffi- culties and uncertainties which we inevitable encounter, we must continue the effort to find some common ground upon which to build a system of values that will answer a continuing need of mankind. 122
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a Morality and Ethics: Toward An Understanding of The Ten Commandments Published Under the Title: “The Decalogue as Morality and Ethics,” in Theology Today, Volume XX, 2, July, 1963. One of the most enduring puzzles of theology, and to philosophers with a religious interests is that of the...
Show morea Morality and Ethics: Toward An Understanding of The Ten Commandments Published Under the Title: “The Decalogue as Morality and Ethics,” in Theology Today, Volume XX, 2, July, 1963. One of the most enduring puzzles of theology, and to philosophers with a religious interests is that of the relation between grace and works. Most men, whether Christian or not, believe that what they do must have something to do with determining their fate. What a man does, for instance how lie treats his associates, has a great deal to do with his success or failure in his business or profession. Indeed, it is a pretty general fact that whether a per- son is happy or miserable in his relations with his fellows depends in large measure upon how he behaves toward them. It is not at all surprising that this general fact about man's mundane existence is easily extended into his religious life, so that it becomes natural for him to suppose that his acts contribute to his spiritual welfare as well. To put the matter in religious terminology, it appears natural enough for a man to suppose that his works have something to do, even though it may be little, with his salvation. The contrary, and in some quarters more acceptable, view is that salvation is purely a matter of grace because mans being depraved, is unable to do any- thing under his own power that is even worthy of praise, much less the reward of salvation. The difficulty arises, it seems to me, when the theologian tries to convince the ordinary man that he is sinful and in need of the grace _ of God, when the patent fact is that the majority of men are rigorously law-abiding. _ Theologians are sometimes, and understandably, accused of talking nonsense when they speak of man's sinful- ness and need of grace. The nonsensical appearance of their talk arises because they often try to maintain two apparently contradictory assertions, namely that even though a man may abide by the law in every detail he may yet be thoroughly sinful. If a man is able, as he often is, to abide by the law by dint of his own efforts, what need has he of grace? The paradox is further confounded by the fact that theologians often try to maintain both that man, because of his original sin, is incapable of doing anything good on his owns and that nevertheless he ought to try to become better than he now is. What kind of sense does it make to maintain that even though a man is unable to do anything good fie nevertheless ought to try? If a man is totally depraved and simply unable to do _ anything good, then there clearly is no values beyond that of mere lip service, in telling him that he ought to do _ something better than he is now doing. When the apparent absurdity of the theologians’ contradictory claims is put together with the fact that men often do a great deal of good, is it any wonder that it is difficult to convince modern man of his sinfulness and need for grace? _ That there is a confusion present here is obvious, but it is not so commonly understood that the reason for the confusion is often our failure to understand that the theologian and the ordinary man have two radically different considerations in mind. When the theologian claims that man is sinful and depraved, he is speaking in the con- text of morality. When the ordinary man maintains that he is able to do many good things, he is speaking in the context of ethics. The purpose of this paper is to attempt to clear up the confusion by pointing out the crucial dif- ference between morality and ethics. Putting the matter in a slightly different way, what I hope to show is that observance or non-observance of a set of rules, such as the Ten Commandments, has nothing whatever to do with morality or conviction of sin. Put this baldly, I will candidly admit that the idea seems strange at first since, in our cultures relatively few people are free of the confusion that is the central concern of this paper, but on contin- ued acquaintance I believe that the distinction between morality and ethics resolves many of the pressing prob- lems in this area and that it accords well with both theological and ordinary usages. It would be very easy, of course, to make my point by WOW the terms 'morality' and 'ethics' in the appropriate manner, but this is not my intention. Rather I Intend to show that the Christian conception of the good life involves two quite different types of statement, both of them indispensable. The first I prefer to associate with morality, because it deals with __ the character of the person rather than with the character of his acts. The second I prefer to associate with ethics, because it deals with the character of the person's acts rather than with his character as a person. However, the . labels do not matter particularly. What does matter is that there is an essential and very important, difference __ between an imperative like "Thou shalt love thy neighbor as thyself"! and one like "Thou shalt not kill."2 .. .continued 23
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Morality and Ethics: Toward An Understanding of The Ten Commandments, continued The Christian conception of the good life, insofar as it has any distinctive character at all, is based upon the first type of imperative rather than upon the second. There is nothing unusual about the set of rules...
Show moreMorality and Ethics: Toward An Understanding of The Ten Commandments, continued The Christian conception of the good life, insofar as it has any distinctive character at all, is based upon the first type of imperative rather than upon the second. There is nothing unusual about the set of rules that we have inherited from the Mosaic tradition, except the fact that they have been remarkably pervasive in western society. Every society has its set of rules, however, and the differences between the various sets are not as great as one might expect, due, no doubt, to the simple fact that respect for life and property are necessary if any society is to survive. The meaning of such rules is generally quite clear, and it is the task of the courts to make them clear when they are vague or ambiguous. Therefore, there is in practice little doubt as to the meaning of injunctions against murder or theft, although it is clearly true that there may be borderline cases wherein it is difficult to decide whether a person has or has not committed robbery or murder. The fact that there are borderline cases, however, is beside the point. The essential point is that murder and theft may be defined by law as precisely as we wish, or as the courts of law find necessary or useful. Whatever ambiguity or vagueness attaches to injunc- tions against murder or theft Is therefore not logically necessary, since we can, and as a matter of fact do make such injunctions as clear as we find necessary or convenient. We know quite well when to classify behavior as falling in the category of murder or of theft. But how is one to know when to classify behavior as falling in the category of loving one's neighbor as oneself? This question leads directly to the heart of the matter, namely the distinction between formal rules of behavior and material rules. In general we are quite familiar with formal rules, particularly in the sciences, in mathemat- ics, and in logic, but we are much less familiar with the importance of formal rules in making judgments about the goodness or badness of behavior. A formal rule is one which is valid independently of any specific subject matter, its meaning being derived entirely from the logical structure of the context in which it is applied. An example taken from logic is the familiar "law of excluded middle" which states merely that, given any proposition whatsoever, it must be either true or false. The key to the formal nature of this so-called "law” lies in the phrase "given any proposition whatsoever," which is meant to imply that the principle holds for any universe of dis- course whatsoever, or, in other words, that its validity is independent of any particular subject matter. 3 Any dis- cipline involves a number of such rules, wherein they constitute merely decisions to use concepts or terms in a certain way. Their function is to provide the logical form or structure which gives order and systematic meaning to the subject matter of the discipline. But they do not determine what that subject matter is to be. A mathemati- cian, for example, provides us with a set of rules that may be used in computing the area, say, of a plane figure, but he cannot, qua mathematician, determine what quantities are to be substituted for the variables in his formu- lae in any given case. Thus the mathematical formulae are useful in discovering the answer to our problem only in the sense that they indicate how the various data may be related to each other. By themselves they provide no answer at all, as far as the area of a given plane figure is concerned. The area of ethical discourse, like any other discipline, is subject to certain formal rules. In the first place, there are those rules which apply to the use of language in every context. Thus it is as important, if one wishes to make sense at all, to avoid contradicting oneself in this area as it is in any other. That such rules apply here as well as anywhere else is quite beyond serious question, but it is not with these particular formal rules that we are presently concerned. What I wish to show is that moral injunctions like "Thou shalt love thy neighbor as thyself" and "Do unto others as you would have them do unto you" are formal rules, which give order and structure to our ethical discourse but which, by themselves, never solve an ethical problem. The point is, I think, quite easily made. Rules such as these, called "categorical imperatives" by Immanuel Kant, are universal in the sense that, if one accepts the Christian conception of the good life, they admit of no exceptions whatsoever. The Christian is always, in all circumstances, under the obligation to treat his neighbor as he himself would wish to be treated. Thus the rule "Thou shalt love thy neighbor as thyself" is independent of circumstances, in precisely the same sense as the law of excluded middle was seen to be independent of its context. But, just as the formal proposition [(p vp’) * (p * p’)’,] is useless until some meaning is given to the variable ‘p’ so the rule "Thou shalt love thy neighbor as thyself" is useless until it has been interpreted in terms of' the concrete situation facing the individual who is required to make an ethical decision. The formal rule by itself will never make an ethical decision for one. This point can be made clear by considering a hypothetical case. 124 .. .continued
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Morality and Ethics: Toward An Understanding of The Ten Commandments, continued Suppose a man borrows a shotgun from a friend on the firm promise to return it within one week. Suppose, fur- ther, that during the time the borrower has the shotgun, the friend from whom he borrowed it becomes...
Show moreMorality and Ethics: Toward An Understanding of The Ten Commandments, continued Suppose a man borrows a shotgun from a friend on the firm promise to return it within one week. Suppose, fur- ther, that during the time the borrower has the shotgun, the friend from whom he borrowed it becomes psychotic and threatens harm to his family and others. When the specified period of time expires, the borrower is faced with the problem of whether to return the shotgun or not. Superficially the example is trite, because I suspect that no one would recommend returning the shotgun in face of the fact that the man from whom he borrowed it, now psychotic, would be likely to use it to harm himself or others. Yet the example is cogent because it illustrates the kind of opposition that may arise between imperatives like, "Always keep your promises" and the individ- ual's concern for others. Clearly here is a case in which keeping one's promise might very well have disastrous consequences. What should our hypothetical borrower do in this case? Perhaps he suddenly remembers that, as a Christian, he is obligated to love his neighbor as himself. True, but this principle does not help him to decide whether to return the shotgun or not, but rather it encourages him to do whatever he believes best expresses his love and concern under these particular circumstances. In other words, the principle encourages him to do what- ever he honestly believes is right under these circumstances, but the principle does not tell him just what the right action under these circumstances is! He, in his role as ethical agent, must make the decision for himself. The principle does not decide the issue for him. Furthermore, he cannot escape moral responsibility for making the decision himself, because the practical rule "Always keep your promises," which normally binds us to abide by the promises we have made, in this case is superceded by a higher moral principle which indicates that under these particular circumstances, keeping one's promise would be morally wrong! To summarize, the above case, and it is very easy to construct any of others like it, indicates that a moral principle like "Thou shalt love thy neighbor as thyself" is a formal principle. It states the primary obligation of the Christian, regardless of what the particular circumstances might be. It is obligatory always and independent- ly of circumstances, but it does not present a ready-made solution to the ethical problem. Rather, its function is to _ indicate the spirit in which the decision, whatever it is under the circumstances, must be made. The individual must make the decision, and he must be held responsible for doing what he honestly believes to be right under these circumstances. By now the point ought to be clear enough. Morality, for the Christian, consists pre- cisely in doing whatever he honestly believes is right. He cannot insist that his behavior must be thus and so, for we have no way of knowing what he himself honestly believes is right under these particular circumstances. _ Only he, and presumably God, are competent to decide whether his behavior is moral, for only these are able to decide whether his actual behavior is consistent with what he believes to be right. This, and only this, is the essence of morality: behavior consistent with what one, honestly believes to be right! It is now time to consider practical or material imperatives like "Thou shalt not kill." Christian societies have tra- ditionally recognized the Ten Commandments as obligations laid upon them. They are obligatory, certainly, but in a quite different sense from the obligation that attaches to formal principles. They are obligatory because no society can survive unless it somehow protects the persons and property of its citizens. But practical principles, _ though they are necessary to good order within a society, are not necessary in the logical sense. They are not independent of circumstances. A set of practical rules of' conduct, whether it be the Ten Commandments or any other code of laws is dependent upon circumstances, and we must therefore be ready to make any adjustments in it that changing conditions may demand. We have already seen that one practical principle, namely "Always keep your promises," does admit of exceptions, for there are circumstances under which it would morally wrong to keep one's promise. This is characteristic of practical principles. They are not necessary in the sense that it is possible to conceive of circumstances under which it would be morally wrong to insist that they be followed. To illustrate this general characteristic of practical ethical principles it would be well to consider the Ten Commandments in somewhat greater detail. In the first place, it should be noted that not all of the Ten Commandments belong in the same general context. The first commandment, “Thou shalt have no other gods before me,” belongs in a theological rather than ethical context. It does not specify a type of behavior, but emphasizes the fact that Christianity and Judaism are monotheistic religions, and hence cannot permit their adherents to substitute other forms in place of worship of the Judeo-Christian God. The second commandment, 125 .. .continued
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Morality and Ethics: Toward An Understanding of The Ten Commandments, continue “Thou shalt not take the Name of the Lord thy God in vain;. . .,”© is similar to the formal principles discussed above. By itself it does not specify a particular form of behavior, but rather it indicates the attitude...
Show moreMorality and Ethics: Toward An Understanding of The Ten Commandments, continue “Thou shalt not take the Name of the Lord thy God in vain;. . .,”© is similar to the formal principles discussed above. By itself it does not specify a particular form of behavior, but rather it indicates the attitude with which the believer properly ought to employ the name of God. Its formal character is illustrated by the fact that Luther, as well as others, felt it necessary to interpret the commandment in terms of practical prohibitions against curs- ing and so on. It is clear that the interpretation given the commandment by Luther does not possess the same authority as does the commandment itself. Precisely similar remarks, mutatis mutandis, might be made regard- ing the third and fourth commandments. They do not specify particular forms of behavior, but indicate the atti- tude the believer properly ought to have toward the Sabbath and toward his parents, respectively. The balance of the commandments belong to a strictly ethical context, unlike the first four. They are practical rules of conduct, designed to promote stability within society, but they are not necessary in the sense that it is quite easy to conceive of situations in which it would be wrong to insist upon them. The fifth commandment, “Thou shalt not kill,” is a classic example. Some interpreters, supposing that the commandment was to be taken as universally applicable, have been forced into the paradoxical situation of supposing that respect for the lives of their enemies required them to sacrifice the lives of their family and friends. But the pacifist can hardly main- tain seriously that there are absolutely no circumstances under which it would be right to take the life of another human being. If, for instance, we had refused to resist the military actions of Nazi Germany under delusion that it would be wrong to take the life of a cruel and sadistic murderer, that decision in all likelihood would have cost the lives of many thousands of innocent people, whose lives were surely of as great value in the eyes of God as were the lives of the Nazi legions. Clearly, to refuse to take the life of a potential murderer under the delusion that his life is intrinsically more valuable than the life of his victim is a mockery of the ethical intent of the fifth commandment. Certainly the commandment is not to be taken lightly. No doubt all alternatives other than physical force ought to be resorted to first, but if they fail, and there appears no way to prevent aggression other than by physical force, then it would be ethically wrong to refuse to employ all the force at our command. To put the point simply, there are times when it is right to take the life of another human being, and when it would be ethically wrong to refuse to do so. The sixth commandment presents a slightly more difficult problem, but, not much more so. Sexual chastity is a highly emotive subject, so it is easy to imagine that any suggestion that under certain circumstances adultery would be ethically right will be met with many a raised eyebrow. But suppose, to take a not-so-extreme exam- ple, that a man and a woman, each the husband or wife of another, were cast away upon an island, with little or no hope of rescue. It would be ridiculous to suppose that it would be ethically wrong for them to co-habitate, even without benefit of clergy! As long as society remains relatively stable, it makes very good sense to regulate the sexual behavior of people, but when circumstances no longer demand sexual chastity, it would be a mockery of the purpose of the commandment to insist upon it. In a case such as this the decision whether to live together as husband and wife could not be made by appealing to the sixth commandment, but only by asking that the man and woman concerned do as they sincerely believe to be right under the circumstances. Certainly it is unlikely, in this day and age, that a situation such as this would ever arise, but this is quite beside the point. The point is that it is possible to conceive of a situation in which it would be ethically wrong to insist upon the sixth commandment, and the possibility of one single instance when insisting upon sexual chastity would be wrong is sufficient to demonstrate that the commandment is not universal. This is all that I wish to maintain. Now that the pattern has been established, the balance of the commandments may quickly be dealt with. The seventh commandment, “Thou shalt not steal,”” is clearly meant to establish respect for property and the right of ownership. But it does not imply that property and ownership are more important than any other consideration. If a situation were to arise in which the only alternatives were taking another’s property without permission, stealing if you will, and starvation, the only proper ethical course is clear. Property is indeed important, but it is not more important than life. If the only alternative to starvation is theft, then stealing another’s property is clearly right. Granted, again, that such extreme situation do not often arise, but the essential point is that it is easy to conceive of a situation in which stealing would be right, and this is sufficient to establish that the seventh commandment does admit of exceptions in principle. Therefore, it is not a universal imperative, but depends for its validity upon circumstances. 126 .. continued
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Morality and Ethics: Toward An Understanding of The Ten Commandments, continued The ninth commandment, “Thou shalt not covet they neighbor’s house,”® and the tenth, “Thou shalt not covet they neighbor’s wife, nor his manservant, nor his maidservant, nor his cattle, nor anything that is thy neigh-...
Show moreMorality and Ethics: Toward An Understanding of The Ten Commandments, continued The ninth commandment, “Thou shalt not covet they neighbor’s house,”® and the tenth, “Thou shalt not covet they neighbor’s wife, nor his manservant, nor his maidservant, nor his cattle, nor anything that is thy neigh- bor’s,”? likewise are intended to establish respect for the property and household of another. Probably it should be noted that the tenth commandment sounds a bit strange to modern ears, for we are not accustomed to think- ing of wives or servants as property, but it is no doubt sound to interpret the commandment as meaning that we ought, insofar as is practical, to leave our neighbor in peace. But there are times when we cannot leave our neighbor in peace. If his status can be maintained only at the expense of social injustice to other people, then jus- tice demands that he be denied the right to maintain servants in favor of at least a reasonable standard of living for others. This fact is recognized by all modern societies that attempt a reasonable just distribution of wealth. Finally, the eighth commandment, “Thou shalt not bear false witness against they neighbor,”!0 is in general an injunction against lying or perjury. Certainly it is extremely important that people respect the truth, for if we could not, in general, depend upon the truthfulness of other people, the result would be social chaos. Yet there clearly are cases in which it is our obligation not to tell the truth. During wartime, for example, it is a soldier’s proper duty to deceive the enemy by any means at his command, because telling the truth could conceivably cost the lives of many of his comrades and perhaps result in defeat of his cause. Other cases could easily be men- ' tioned in which it would be clearly wrong to tell the truth, and right not to tell the truth. Again, the possibility of a single instance in which it would be wrong to insist upon following the commandment is sufficient to indi- cate that the commandment is not absolute but dependent upon circumstances. The heart of the case is now completed. It remains only to indicate the consequences of the distinction between formal moral principles like “Thou shalt love they neighbor as thyself,” and practical ethical principles like “Thou shalt not kill.” The moral character of the person depends upon whether his behavior is consistent with his beliefs, with what he sincerely believes to be right. As far as this consideration is concerned the consequences of his behavior are immaterial. Inasmuch as I am convinced that society has no right to determine what a man shall believe, I am similarly convinced that society is in no position to judge the moral character of a man's acts. Only the individual himself and, the Christian believes, God can be in the position to judge the moral character of aman. At first this point may seem a bit strange, for it implies that one cannot judge the moral character of ~ even an Adolph Hitler. One may certainly judge that his behavior was rash, ill considered, stupid, contrary to established law, and so on, but one cannot judge that Hitler was immoral, since we are not in a position to decide whether his behavior was consistent with his beliefs. Strange as this consequence may seem, it is consistent with the Christian view, for Christians have generally held that no man is competent to judge the moral character of another. This prerogative is God's alone. The case is quite different when practical imperatives are considered. It clearly is the state's right to regulate the behavior of its citizens in the Interest of peace, harmony, justice, and stability. To this end, codes of law such as the Ten Commandments are established and the state requires that its citizens abide by them. These codes of law are not absolute, for as societies change the laws which govern them must change too. To require a changing . society to abide by an unchanging code of law inevitably results in difficult situations wherein the individual, in order to make a rational, intelligent decision based upon changing circumstances, is forced to break the law in -. order to fulfill the demands of higher, formal moral principles. The example of the Pharisees of Christ's time is _ tragic not because they obeyed the law, which is every citizen's duty so long as it can be done in conscience, but because they had abdicated their individual moral responsibility and depended upon rigid laws to make their ethical decisions for them. In other words, they had become slaves to the laws and could not seem to under- stand that the law must be made to conform to the changing needs of man in a changing society. The Christian's vaunted freedom from the law comes down to this, recognition, as Jesus put its that the law was made for man _ and not man for the law! What could this mean other than that it is a travesty of justice and good sense to sup- pose that the code of laws formulated by ancient Judaic society must necessarily apply in its original form to all subsequent forms of society? The Jews are to be respected very highly, indeed, for their insight into the fact that respect for persons and property is necessary to the good order of society, but we need not suppose that the expression they gave these principles must remain forever unchanged. The demands of modern society require that decisions be made according to circumstance, and we cannot bind ourselves to an ancient code of laws 27 .. continued
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Morality and Ethics: Toward An Understanding of The Ten Commandments, continued tf that was never intended to apply to a complex society such as we know today. I do not, of courses recommend that we abandon the Ten Commandments, for the principles they express are basic to our society, but if and...
Show moreMorality and Ethics: Toward An Understanding of The Ten Commandments, continued tf that was never intended to apply to a complex society such as we know today. I do not, of courses recommend that we abandon the Ten Commandments, for the principles they express are basic to our society, but if and when considerations of Christian love demand a breach of a literal interpretation of the Mosaic laws no guilt feel- ings are required. For this is precisely what Jesus meant. The principle of Christian love is logically prior to its expression through the laws and when the law fails, as it occasionally does, to express that principles then it is only reasonable to adjust the law to conform to the principle of which it is the expression. We are now in a position to return to the problem with which this paper began, the apparently paradoxical belief that although man is basically sinful, he nevertheless ought and is able to improve his ways of behaving. The paradox is only apparent, and not real, because the two beliefs a) that man is basically a sinful being, and b) that man nevertheless can and ought to behave in an ethical manner, are not logically contradictory. They can be, and perhaps are in fact, both true because they apply to completely different contexts, of morals and ethics respec- tively. When the Christian believes that he is able, apparently on his own, to do many good things, he is perfect- ly right. He is able to do good acts, or bad ones, in the sense that he is free to abide by the code of laws estab- lished by his society or to refuse to abide try it. It makes perfectly good sense to enjoin a person to improve his behavior in the interest of pence and harmony within society. It is for this reason that society quite properly insists upon the right to require conformity to the law, to punish its infringements and to maintain correctional institutions for the purpose of restraining or rehabilitating those who will not or cannot conform. This right of society is not arbitrary, however. The Christian character of a society is determined by the extent to which its laws express the formal principle of Christian love. At the same time, however, a person's conformity or non-conformity to the laws of society has nothing whatever to do with the question of his justification before God, because it has nothing to do with his moral character. As we have seen, a man's moral character depends only upon whether or not his behavior is consistent with, what he honestly believes to be right, and this question society is in no position to decide. The Christian doctrine of depravity means simply that no man always does that which he believes to be right. In appearance, this is an empirical claim, although an odd one for it is difficult to know how to go about obtaining the evidence necessary to establish its probability. The relation between a man's beliefs and his behavior seems to be of the sort that can be observed, if at all, only by the individual himself. Yet the insights of modern psychiatry lead us to suspect that people are very often unaware themselves of the motives for their acts. Perhaps it is more significant to say that the belief that no man always does what he honestly believes to be right is an article of faith, which has some ground in empirical fact but can never be conclusively established. No doubt the best evidence for such a claim lies in each person's own awareness that some, and perhaps most, of his acts are inconsistent with his beliefs. Hence, although in form it appears to be an empirical claims probably the final significance of the Christian insistence upon the depravity of all men lies in its ability to awaken each of us to the fact that he is, if he honestly examines his own motives to the best of his ability, guilty before God. As far as man's justification before God is concerned, however, the only competent judge is God. If one is careful to point out that the belief that man is basically sinful is entirely independent of whether or not he is guilty of having broken the law, there should be less difficulty then there usually is in convincing man of his sinfulness before God and his need of redemption. FOOTNOTES 1. Romans 13:9. 2. Exodus 20:13. 3. The purely formal character of this law may also be shown by the fact that it can be expressed symbolically as [(p v p’)*(p © p’)’], read “either ‘p’ is true or ‘p’ is false, but not both,” and where ‘p’ stands for any proposition whatsoever. 4 Cf., Matthew 7:12. 5 Exodus 20:3. 6. Exodus 20:7. 7. Exodus 20:15. 8 Exodus 20:17. 9 Ibid. 0 Exodus 20:16.
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Predictability and Ethical Freedom Published in The Christian Scholar, XLVI/2, Summer, 1963. (Yale University Divinity School) Does the fact that man's behavior is to some extent predictable and controllable, and is becoming more and more so, preclude the possibility that man is nevertheless free...
Show morePredictability and Ethical Freedom Published in The Christian Scholar, XLVI/2, Summer, 1963. (Yale University Divinity School) Does the fact that man's behavior is to some extent predictable and controllable, and is becoming more and more so, preclude the possibility that man is nevertheless free and responsible for his acts? In an age that is largely , dominated by scientific rather than religious or ethical modes of thought, questions like the above are being fre- quently asked and widely discussed.! Many contemporary discussions of the matter, however, leave the reader with the uncomfortable feeling that too often the issues are confused rather than clarified. One basic reason for ~~ the confusion, I believe, is that too much attention is paid to the so-called determinist vs. indeterminist contro- . versy, which is usually put in such a way as to make a satisfactory resolution of the problem of human freedom impossible. For instance, it is often claimed that determinism is an essential presupposition, or at least a neces- " sary operating hypothesis, of the human sciences, so the claim that human behavior is, at least sometimes, free is - construed as an attack on the validity of the sciences. Or, on the other hand, it is sometimes said that the trend away from dogmatism in the physical sciences, as a consequence of the principles of indeterminacy and of com- plementarity, implies, by-extension, that not only the behavior of electrons but also of human beings is in princi- , ple indeterminate and unpredictable, and that this is sufficient warrant for the metaphysical claim that man's behavior is, at least sometimes, free in the sense of being uncaused. It is, however, quite obvious that it is a very » long step from Heisenberg's indeterminacy principle to the claim that some human behavior, at least, is acausal. Hence, the claim that quantum physics provides the long sought support for the indeterminist position is often laughed to scorn as a simple non sequitur, which it is. - The intent of this paper is to show that there is truth on both sides of the issue, but also that this way of putting the problem serves only to confuse rather than clarify it. The issue of determinism vs. indeterminism, far from ' being basic to establishing the validity of ethics, is a chimera, a hold-over from an earlier rationalistic conception _of science. The significance for ethics of indeterminacy and complementarity in quantum physics is not that it permits man a measure of freedom in the metaphysical sense, but rather that the determinist vs. indeterminist - controversy is both unnecessary and improper. It is possible, I believe, to recognize the validity of empirical sci- ence in as rigorous a sense as could be desired, and at the same time to insist that man is nevertheless free and responsible for his own behavior in the only senses of 'free' and 'responsible’ that are significant in ethical dis- ~ . course. There are many excellent expressions of the position which William James termed "hard determinism," classical as well as modern, but one of the clearest and most unequivocal is Spinoza's: "Those parts of the universe already laid down absolutely appoint and decree what the other parts shall be. The future has no ambiguous possibilities hidden in its womb." Omar Khayyam has also expressed the idea in the Rubaiyat: With Earth's first clay They did the Last Man knead, And there of the Last Harvest sow'd the Seed: And the first Morning of Creation wrote What the Last Dawn of Reckoning shall read.” But helpless Pieces of the Game He plays Upon this Chequer-board of Nights and Days; Hither and thither moves, and checks, and slays, And one by one back in the Closet lays.3 _ The import of these quotations is that every event that happens in the universe occurs as it does as the rigid con- sequence of prior events which were its causes. In this context the relation between a cause and its effect is con- ceived as analogous to a logical relation. If, that is, the causes occur, then the effects must occur also. Sometimes .. .continued 129
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Predictability and Ethical Freedom, continued it is said that the universe is a rational order in which every event is connected to every other event by strictly necessary relations, so that, given one event or series of events, other events must follow in a sense analogous to the way in which...
Show morePredictability and Ethical Freedom, continued it is said that the universe is a rational order in which every event is connected to every other event by strictly necessary relations, so that, given one event or series of events, other events must follow in a sense analogous to the way in which the conclusion of a valid deductive argument follows from its premises. Or, occasionally, it is suggested that the cause somehow ‘forces' the effect, so that, given the cause, the effect is 'made' to happen. It is not difficult to see that, if one assumes a universe of this sort, a manes actions, being empirical events, occur as they must as the necessary consequences of causes occurring earlier in his personal history. He could not, then, it is supposed, reasonably be held responsible for them. The contrary position, indeterminism, is not usually so precise, which is perhaps one reason for its difficulty in finding acceptance in an age which places a high premium on precision. In its extreme and most easily stated form, indeterminism maintains that at least insofar as human behavior is concerned no act is determined. All human acts are 'free' in the sense that each one represents a choice on the part of the actor, for which he ought to be held responsible, and none is caused in the sense of being 'implied’ or 'forced' by prior events. Stated this baldly, the obvious fallacy of this view is apparent at once. It is extremely difficult, if not entirely impossible, to deny that at least sometimes an individual's prior experience has bad an effect upon his subsequent behavior. It is almost universally acknowledged, for example, that if a young child has a traumatic experience involving a dog he may subsequently have a profound and apparently unreasonable fear of dogs, even though he may him- self be unaware of the 'cause' of his fear. There is so much evidence in support of such occurrences that it would seem highly unreasonable to deny that early experiences may, at least sometimes, have an effect upon subse- quent experiences in the sense of causing them. In general, one needs only to point to the data regarding condi- tioned learning-to suggest rather strongly that one's behavior is in all probability at least partially the conse- quence of his earlier experiences. Because of the difficulty in maintaining indeterminism in its extreme form it is probable that no one now serious- ly maintains this view. Instead, indeterminists are usually a good deal more cautious, maintaining that even though human behavior is probably sometimes caused, there are at least some other times when it is not. It is the latter instances, when human behavior is not caused, that are held to be significant for ethics. Generally the indeterminist turns for support not to data regarding instances of uncaused behavior, but to the probably univer- sal feeling or conviction that, at least sometimes, one may choose between a number of alternative courses of action. That is, it is very difficult to deny that probably everyone, at least sometimes, feels free to do as he choos- es. For example, I may choose either to remain at the typewriter or to leave it and do something else, and the fact that I remain is due to my having made the choice to do so. Therefore, having freely chosen to remain at the typewriter, I am responsible for my behavior and am liable for whatever praise or blame may attach to that act. There are two major objections to the position of modified indeterminism I have just been explaining. The first results from the frequency with which the phrase ‘at least sometimes’ has had to be employed. The moderate indeterminist maintains that ‘some’ human behavior is undetermined, but he is hard put to specify precisely which acts are determined and which are not. It seems to him that if human beings are to be held responsible for their behavior, then at least some of their acts must be free in the sense of being uncaused. Since he is convinced of the former, the indeterminist tries, sometimes desperately, to distinguish behavior which is free from that which is not, but there appears to be no good way of doing this. Human acts are not labeled 'free,' or 'deter- mined,’ so distinguishing the one from the other requires that we have some dependable criterion, which is pre- cisely what we do not appear to have. The second serious objection to the position of modified indeterminism is that it would seem to imply that some human behavior, being acausal, is independent of other empirical events and hence in principle unpredictable. It is perfectly clear that human behavior, because of its complexity, is very difficult to predict with precision, particularly in the individual case, but the fact that it is difficult, in practice, to predict does not imply that it is in principle unpredictable. Psychologists, for example, are prone to suggest that the difficulty they experience in predicting individual behavior is due to the youth of their science but that, as their science matures, it will become possible to make more and more dependable predictions of how a given individual will behave in a given case. We are certainly justified in doubting, if we wish, that psychology will ever approach the degree of precision enjoyed by the physical sciences, but there is no warrant for the claim that human behavior is in principle unpredictable, as the modified indeterminist maintains that it, at least sometimes, is. 30 .. continued t
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Predictability and Ethical Freedom, continued In view of these considerations, some ethical theorists adopt a position known, in William James' phrase, as "soft determinism." The soft determinists find no contradiction between determinism and the belief that human beings are sometimes free agents...
Show morePredictability and Ethical Freedom, continued In view of these considerations, some ethical theorists adopt a position known, in William James' phrase, as "soft determinism." The soft determinists find no contradiction between determinism and the belief that human beings are sometimes free agents. Central to this position is a distinction between two different senses of the term ‘free.’ Metaphysically the term 'free' is sometimes taken to mean ‘acausal,’ but this is not the meaning that the term is understood as having in ethical discourse. When we call an action ‘free,’ what we mean is not that it is uncaused but that the actor was not compelled or constrained to perform it. Sometimes people are compelled by law or other threat of force to perform certain acts. At other times they may behave in certain ways because they are drugged, or are acting under posthypnotic suggestion, or are suffering from some overpowering, irra- tional urge, as in kleptomania. On such occasions human beings are not free, and hence cannot be held responsi- ble because they were unable to exercise the choice which is held essential to being morally blamable. On other occasions, however, people act as they do, not because they have been constrained, but because they have chosen to act in those ways. On these latter occasions they are held to be free, and hence responsible, agents even though their actions were caused just as much as were acts that were not deemed free because they were con- _ strained. The point is not that some human acts are caused while others are not, but ,that some are constrained while others are not. _ The controversy between hard and soft determinists appears to be over the role played by wishes, desires, etc., in , human behavior. Some hard determinists, like Schopenhauer, sometimes suggest that human desires and efforts have no causal efficacy as far as human behavior is concerned, but if they were pressed they probably would grant that these do make a causal difference in the course of events. The issue is not, therefore, over whether desires, purposes, etc., are effective causes of human behavior, but over whether these are themselves the effects of prior causes. The hard determinist might grant, that is, that human efforts, desires, etc., are at least part of the ~ cause of human behavior, but at the same time he regards these as having been caused by prior events. It may be possible for a man to do as he wills, he might say, but is it possible for him to will as he wills? For this reason, William James regarded soft determinism as an evasion. fe We have indicated the four possible positions with regard to the determinism vs. indeterminism controversy, and ~ have found each of them unsatisfactory for one reason or another. Might it not seem reasonable to suspect, then, _ that there is something amiss with this way of stating the problem? In this paper I wish to present an option which avoids the determinism vs. indeterminism controversy, and hence is, I believe, immune to the objections _ we have cited above. The option I will offer is similar to soft determinism in that it would permit both ethical freedom and responsibility and a rigorous behavior science, but the crucial difference lies in that it avoids the paradox of maintaining both that human behavior is determined (caused) and that it is free (uncaused). _ Although I shall maintain that human behavior is free, and hence responsible, I shall also maintain that it is com- pletely unnecessary for science to insist upon determinism as either presupposition or working hypothesis. _ We owe the soft determinists a considerable debt of gratitude for having made us aware that in the expression 'man is a free ethical agent' the term 'free' is ambiguous. Sometimes it is taken to mean ‘uncaused,' while at other times ‘unconstrained.’ Classical, deterministic science assumed, among other things, that every event is caused in the sense that given a certain set of antecedents (cause) a specifiable consequent (effect) must occur, and that given any event (effect) it is possible to discover the antecedents (cause) which occasioned it. Those determinis- tic sciences which were also mechanistic suggested that the relation between cause and effect was the same as, or at least analogous to, a logical or mathematical relation so that given the one it ought to be possible to infer the other. Other deterministic sciences maintained that the cause-effect relation is volitional, so that a cause in some sense ‘forces’ the effect. In neither case was it possible to interpret any event, including human acts, as being free of causal antecedents. In this context it is quite obvious that for an ethicist to suggest that human behavior is ever free (uncaused) implies that it is for that reason incapable of scientific explanation. Here, I think, we have _ the roots of the controversy over determinism. A deterministic science is clearly inimical to the ethicist's claim ~ that at least some human behavior is free (uncaused),-and vice versa. Hence it appeared that we might have either a rigorous empirical science, or a responsible ethics, but not both. .. .continued 31
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Predictability and Ethical Freedom, continued It is now pretty generally recognized that there have been extravagant claims made on both sides. In their eager- ness to establish a rigorous science, some scientists have maintained not only that every single event in the uni- verse is inherently...
Show morePredictability and Ethical Freedom, continued It is now pretty generally recognized that there have been extravagant claims made on both sides. In their eager- ness to establish a rigorous science, some scientists have maintained not only that every single event in the uni- verse is inherently predictable but also that it may someday be possible to achieve absolute precision. On the other hind some ethicists, perhaps reacting with understandable horror to the concept of an absolutely deter- mined universe, tried to maintain the absurd position that human behavior is acausal, absolutely independent of any antecedents in the heredity or experience of the individual. The impossibility of maintaining either of these positions is now so patent that it is difficult to understand how anyone could have maintained them seriously. There are several relevant comments one might make regarding classical mechanistic science. The first is that determinism taken as a presupposition cannot be demonstrated as true, or false for that matter. This has been said so often as to be nearly trite, but for the sake of orderliness perhaps it should be mentioned that the reason why it is impossible to demonstrate the truth of determinism is that if determinism is true, then the assertion that it is true is a determined event just as much as is any other, and hence is no more ‘true’ than is the assertion that determinism is false. In other words, if determinism is true, then the distinction between truth and falsity is lost, for no event, including the assertion that determinism is true, has any priority over any other event, including the assertion that determinism is false. Since it is impossible to demonstrate that determinism is true, the only reason for its employment in a science would seem to be the belief that it is somehow necessary to presuppose that an event is predictable in order to defend the right to predict it; i-e., that determinism is necessary either as a presupposition or as a working hypothesis of a rigorous empirical science. But this is absurd. The only way to defend the assertion that an event is predictable is to go ahead and predict it! Not only is it impossible to con- struct a deterministic metaphysics as the supposed ground of empirical science, it is also unnecessary. The only way to defend, significantly, the right of modern science to predict human behavior is to point to their success in doing so. No one now doubts seriously that it is possible, within limits, to predict human behavior. We do not know what those limits are in any absolute sense, but we do not have any justification for assuming that there are none. All we know is that the behavior sciences do have some success in predicting what people will or will not do, but we also know that their ability to do so is limited, at least at the present time. In one sense we do not know what their success may be in the future; we can only wait and see. In another sense, however, there seems to be good reason for suspecting that they will never reach perfection. For one thing, a great deal of the data is now Stated in statistical terms, and it is very difficult indeed to know how statistical data concerning large groups of people may be applied to the individual case. For instance, although it is possible to predict quite accurately how many persons in any population will become psychotic during the next year, it is presently impossible to state who they will be. Indeed, one cannot say that this will never become possible, for we cannot predict what degree of accuracy the behavioral sciences will achieve, but the increasing dependence of these sci- ences on statistical evidence perhaps justifies some doubt that absolute accuracy will ever be achieved. But it is important to realize that this doubt does not in the least imply a criticism of the behavior sciences. Certainly they are pragmatically justified in achieving whatever degree of precision they can, and there is no good reason for placing artificial barriers in their way. One reason for the supposed antithesis between ethics and a rigorous behavioral science is the fact that writers on ethics have been guilty in the past of trying to limit, quite artificially, the attempt of the scientist to predict human behavior. If it is suggested, as it sometimes is, that human behavior is entirely acausal, independent of hereditary or environmental influences, then it would appear that education and religious or moral training would be quite without effect on the behavior of the individual. Anyone who maintains this patently absurd position is hoist on his own petard, for he could not expect even his own ethical discourse to have any effect whatsoever on the behavior of his audience. Thus indeterminism in its extreme form is self-defeating. If, on the other hand, one tries to maintain that although some behavior is caused whereas other acts are free in the sense of uncaused, then it appears necessary to have some criterion for distinguishing acts that are free, in this sense, from acts that are not free. In spite of the heroic efforts of a great many writers on ethical subjects, such a criteri- on is precisely what we do not have, or at least we cannot seem to reach agreement on what it might be. The encouraging thing to notice, however, is that the question of whether human behavior is free, and hence respon- sible, is entirely independent of whether or not it is caused. 3 .. continued
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Predictability and Ethical Freedom, continued As we have noted, determinism implies that human behavior is in every instance caused. But it is impossible to determine whether determinism is true. Therefore, it is impossible to determine whether human behavior is caused. But we do know that it is,...
Show morePredictability and Ethical Freedom, continued As we have noted, determinism implies that human behavior is in every instance caused. But it is impossible to determine whether determinism is true. Therefore, it is impossible to determine whether human behavior is caused. But we do know that it is, at least to some degree, predictable, and that in order to maintain that it is predictable it is not necessary to assume that it is determined. Thus we do not know whether human behavior is free or not, in the sense of determined or undetermined. The determinism vs. indeterminism controversy is irre- solvable, but it is also, fortunately irrelevant. What the writer on ethical topics really wants to know is not whether human behavior is caused but whether it is responsible. The answer to this question depends on whether an individual's acts are constrained. Sometimes they are not, since any society permits its citizens some latitude of choice not fixed by law or rigid custom. Also, sometimes they are, as when the person is required by law to perform some act, regardless of his own wishes or convictions in the matter. Furthermore, we know that persons under the influence of drugs, hypnosis, or some mania are unable to make rational decisions, and hence, quite properly, we do not hold them responsible for their behavior. Rather we attempt to reinstate their ability to make responsible choices. There is still a confusion here, however. In the case of constrained behavior, we believe that the kleptomaniac, for instance, is not responsible for his behavior because it is caused by factors beyond his control. In the case of unconstrained behavior, however, we assume that the behavior of relatively normal individuals is responsible, even though, as far as we know, it may be the result of causes of which we are unaware. It might appear, there- fore, that we are inconsistent in treating some behavior as irresponsible because it is caused, and other behavior as responsible even though it may be, as far as we know, caused. This apparent inconsistency is, however, due to our failure to recognize sufficiently the distinction between morality and ethics, and the correlative distinction between the roles of God and of society in making moral and ethical judgments, respectively. I have dealt with the distinction between morality and ethics in considerable detail elsewhere* and will refer to it here only to the extent necessary for purposes of this discussion. The concern of morality is the character of the actor, which is determined by his success or failure in acting as he honestly believes is right. Since society does not have the right to constrain a man's beliefs, and; in any case, is not in a position to judge whether his behavior is consistent with his beliefs, morality is not its concern. Only the individual himself and, we believe, God are in the privileged position of being able to compare a man's acts with his beliefs and to judge his moral character accordingly. Ethics, however, deals with the character of a man's acts, objectively, and it is clearly the right and obligation of society to judge a man's acts for they determine whether he is able to live amicably with his fellows. Men who live together must, in the interest of peace and justice, abide by certain rules established to protect the security of the person and of property, and society must be grant- ed the privilege of judging a man's acts as advantageous or deleterious to the interests of all people in that socie- ty. The confusion we have referred to can now be clarified. Even though the moral question may, in some sense, depend upon whether a man’s beliefs and acts are caused, this is entirely beside the point when our concern is the ethical one of the character of a man’s acts per se. The question of a man's character is a moral and religious question, which can be answered, if at all, only by the man himself or by God. Therefore, the fact that we do not really know whether a man's beliefs and acts are caused does not preclude us from making ethical judgments about the propriety of a man's acts in relation to the lives, rights, and property of others. The issue of determin- ism vs. indeterminism arose because people erroneously supposed it was their right and obligation to make moral judgments about the behavior and character of other people. But we now know that this is impossible. As far as the behavior of other people is concerned, we are limited to making ethical judgments which are based on the purely practical fact that some behavior is consistent with the rights of others whereas some behavior is not. The fact that human behavior is predictable, to whatever extent that is or will become possible, is entirely imma- terial to the ethical judgment. What is material to the ethical judgment is the question of whether a man's behav- ior is constrained, and even here society cannot make judgments about the moral character of a person but can _ only take steps to see that the individual is enabled or required, as the case may be, to respect the lives and prop- erty of others. Determinism, even if tenable (which, we have maintained, it is not) might apply to the moral question, which, as we have seen, is entirely outside our province except in each individual's own case. But .. .continued 133
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Predictability and Ethical Freedom, continued determinism is logically irrelevant to the ethical question since a man's behavior, even if caused, may still be inimical to the interests of society at large and hence may have to be constrained or changed. What does being ‘held responsible for one's...
Show morePredictability and Ethical Freedom, continued determinism is logically irrelevant to the ethical question since a man's behavior, even if caused, may still be inimical to the interests of society at large and hence may have to be constrained or changed. What does being ‘held responsible for one's acts' mean? It does not mean that society has either the ability or the right to make judgments about the moral character of the person, for we are hard put at best to determine whether the person has acted morally--i.e., whether he has done as he thought right and proper--if, indeed, we are ever able to so determine. Instead, society can properly and in fact must hold the individual responsible for his behavior in the ethical sense--i.e., in the sense that if his behavior is anti-social, injurious to other persons, society must restrain and attempt to correct his activity. Holding the person responsible in this sense is the right and obligation of society regardless of the causes of his behavior. We are interested in the causes of behavior not in order to make moral judgments but to know how we can best go about correcting his behavior. Hence, again, to the ethical problem the determinism vs. indeterminism issue is irrelevant. To the moral issue it would be rele- vant, indeed, if we were in a position to decide whether bard determinism is the case, which, in fact, we are not. The final conclusion is now obvious. The human sciences do not need to assume that human behavior is deter- mined. Neither do they have to assume that it is predictable. The question of whether, or to what extent, we can predict the behavior of a human being is not a theoretical issue at all but a practical one. The best possible apolo- getics for psychology, for instance, is not to maintain the undemonstrable metaphysical assumption of determin- ism but to point to the success of psychology in the prediction and control of human behavior. With this pro- gram the ethicist need have no quarrel. The fact that human behavior is to some extent predictable does not at all preclude ethical judgments about the suitability of a man's behavior. In fact the contributions which psychol- ogy and the other behavioral sciences make to our understanding of man's acts, particularly the process of learn- ing, can be of great value to the ethicist for he is, or at least ought to be, as interested in the improvement of behavior as he is in making judgments about its propriety. The business of ethics is not merely to criticize man's behavior, but to help him to be a better man than he is. To do this properly it is only good sense to utilize all of the information at our disposal. The behavioral sciences and ethics, therefore, are not antagonists at all, but asso- ciates having the saw ultimate purpose, the improvement of human society. FOOTNOTES 1. Cf. Hook, Sidney, et. al., Determinism and Freedom. New York: Collier Books, 1961. 2. Omar Khayyam, Rubaiyat. Edward Fitzgerald, tr. Cleveland and New York: World Publishing Co., 1947. Stanza LXXIII. 3. Op. Cit., Stanza LXIX. 4. Cf. “Morality and Ethics: Toward an Understanding of The Ten Commandments.” As yet unpublished. 134
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135 On Religion and Modern Science: A Linguistic Approach * Augsburg Faculty Lectures * October 1984 Published in Faculty Lectures 84/85, Augsburg College © Perhaps you will forgive me if I begin with a personal anecdote that will, I hope, give you some idea of the rea- sons for the topic of this...
Show more135 On Religion and Modern Science: A Linguistic Approach * Augsburg Faculty Lectures * October 1984 Published in Faculty Lectures 84/85, Augsburg College © Perhaps you will forgive me if I begin with a personal anecdote that will, I hope, give you some idea of the rea- sons for the topic of this paper. Not everyone's interests or concerns are the same as mine, but I suspect that most of you have at one time or another run into a similar situation, and hence can share at least some of my worry. After all, our chief interest is education, and it is more than a little troubling that there continue to be educated individuals who show little regard for research and scholarship. Not long ago I was asked to be one of a number of persons to teach a Bible study course entitled "Search," using materials quite recently published by the American Lutheran Church. I agreed, not without serious misgivings, since I am not a scholar of the biblical literature. At least, I thought, I will learn something in the process, and in that I was not wrong. In some ways I learned more than I bargained for, and thereby hangs the tale. The first part of the course dealt with the book of Acts, and that didn't go too badly. I had access to a number of excellent sources, including the "Search" study materials, the Oxford edition of the RSV, and some fine commen- taries. Thus I could refer to some of the results of modern biblical and archaeological research. But I began to realize that I was in trouble when those who were "in charge” of the course objected strongly to the suggestion that the authorship of Acts is in some doubt; that the accounts of Paul's journeys are somewhat uneven; that Luke, or whoever wrote Acts, might have filled in a few details here and there when he was not in possession of all the facts; that Paul may have made an unwise decision now and then; or that Paul was not above changing his mind when the occasion demanded. It did not trouble me to entertain the possibility that Luke and Paul had some human foibles, but some people did not like that suggestion at all. They seemed to want to believe that the author of the book of Acts could not have been mistaken, even in the slightest detail; and that the Apostle Paul never did anything foolish or say the wrong thing under the pressures of the moment. But, as I say, Acts didn't go too badly. It was when we turned to the book of Genesis that I began to realize that I was really in trouble. Most of you Probably know that modern scholarship suggests that parts of Genesis were written at different times, beginning about 950 B.C. and continuing into the period of the Babylonian Captivity in the mid-sixth cen- tury B.C., and were based on an oral tradition beginning much earlier. If that is the case, Genesis had not been written by a single author (Moses, according to earlier commentators), but by an unknown number. Even a casu- al reading of Genesis reveals parallel, and yet somewhat different, accounts of the Creation and of the Flood, for example. Based on terms that the RSV translates as "Lord" and as "God," the two accounts are respectively desig- nated as "J" and "P," of which the "J" account is earlier and the "P" account somewhat later. The difficulty first arose when we teachers were told that the distinction between the "J" and "P" accounts was to be rejected, and the older, more traditional single authorship should be substituted for it. If you examine the "Search" course materials, you will recognize that to reject the "J" and "P" account distinction undercuts the author's enterprise substantially, and renders it largely worthless. That was bad enough; it gets worse. When we talked about the Creation account in Genesis 1 and 2, we were informed that no emphasis was to be placed on the ancient Jewish cosmology, and that any possibility of the evo- lution of species was to be ruled out, ostensibly because evolution is "only a theory which Genesis 1 refutes," but, I suspect, more concretely because, as one person put it, "I do not want to believe that my ancestors were apes.” (It may be worthwhile to point out here that Genesis 1 suggests a somewhat higher conception of the animal kingdom, inasmuch much as the creation of human and other animals took place in the same context.) Furthermore, it was suggested that to cast any doubt on the authorship of Genesis, or to suggest that the Genesis account of Creation was anything but a straight- forward, historical account of the process of creation, would be to destroy the participants’ confidence in the authority of the Bible in all respects whatever. Somewhat naively, perhaps, I had thought that evolution, except for details still under investigation and clarification, was no longer - anissue. At least I am aware that whereas some years ago I could easily get a discussion going in my classes merely by mentioning the topic of evolution, that is no longer the case. My students seem to take it pretty much .. .continued
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On Religion and Modern Science: A Linguistic Approach ¢ October 1984, continued in stride. One would think that the Scopes trial would have laid the matter to rest. However, I came to realize that, unfortunately, like old soldiers, religious opposition to modern science and scholarship never dies...
Show moreOn Religion and Modern Science: A Linguistic Approach ¢ October 1984, continued in stride. One would think that the Scopes trial would have laid the matter to rest. However, I came to realize that, unfortunately, like old soldiers, religious opposition to modern science and scholarship never dies: but also that, unlike old soldiers, it never fades away, either! Perhaps you will agree that the foregoing episode, while unimportant in itself, is a rather sad illustration of what I take to be a common problem in our modern world. The religiously oriented person often seems to be faced with a difficult decision, "or it may seem that one is forced to choose whether to view the world either as it is portrayed by some principles of faith or according to the models afforded by contemporary empirical science. Whatever one's decision in the matter, or whether one avoids making any decision at all, the consequences are often highly disturbing. Ours is an age largely dominated by the sciences, so much so that there is a real tempta- tion to consider any question not answerable by scientific procedures as a mere pseudo -question, not worthy of serious consideration. Yet, an the other hand, at least some of us are so imbued with the notions that some things in the world are of more value than others. that some ways of acting are proper and others improper, and that belief or disbelief in God is a serious matter, that we find it most difficult to abandon these ways of thinking. So we often avoid the issue, accepting in a rather uncritical fashion the account given us of the world by the sci- ences, and in an equally uncritical way giving at least lip service to a religious conception of the world, yet uncomfortably aware that something is wrong somewhere. On the surface, at least, it appears to many as though the scientific and the religious accounts of the world cannot both be true (although, logically, both might be false), and so considerable effort is made to discover some way in which these apparently conflicting views might be reconciled. In a way it is strange that science and religion, perhaps the two greatest interests of humankind, have often and perhaps even usually been thought to exclude each other. There is nothing surprising in the fact that people are concerned with learning as much as possible about themselves and the world in which they live. Besides satisfy- ing our natural curiosity, scientific knowledge has considerable practical value. On the other hand, neither is it to be wondered at that people are intensely interested in values and in God. The world is often a painful and dis- appointing place, and when this is so it appears natural for us to wonder why, and to long for an existence free of strife and pain. Furthermore, as social creatures we must live with one another, and in the interest of getting along with others, and possibly even occasionally improving society, certain rules and norms of behavior have obvious practical value. It is therefore not surprising that we should have this dual interest, and it is not at all obvious why interest in the one should be thought to exclude interest in the other. My main purpose in this lecture is to show that our interest in gaining a scientific and pragmatic understanding of the world need not rule out faith in God and in the validity and importance of claims to value. Conversely, faith in God does not make it necessary, or even desirable, to reduce the rigor of the sciences. It is entirely possi- ble to commit oneself sincerely to the Christian faith and yet to insist that the sciences be pursued as rigorously as their methods and limitations will permit. The antagonism between science and religion arises most often because of a conflict of attitudes, due largely to misunderstandings on both sides. Garvin McCain and Erwin Segal, authors of The Game of Science (Brooks/Cole Publishing Company, 1982), say that "Science is primarily an attitude toward problem solving: as such, it often has implications far beyond the immediate data- implications that may indeed profoundly influence beliefs" (p. 12). They suggest, further, that because "Many scientists find it difficult to reconcile scientific attitudes and religious feelings and beliefs . . . a great portion of the scientific com- munity simply ignores organized religion" (p. 24). While I cannot judge the accuracy of this claim, it is precisely the sort of attitude I'm talking about. My hope is that something can be done to make that reconciliation a little easier, and perhaps the elimination of some common misunderstandings will help to accomplish that aim. I. The domination of certain eras of our history by concern for either "other-worldly" or "this-worldly" affairs, for example perhaps the medieval and modern ages, suggests that at times it has been thought that religion and sci- ence were exclusive interests. But the fact that this has sometimes been the case does not imply that it must be. .. continued 136
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oy On Religion and Modern Science: A Linguistic Approach * October 1984, continued There have generally been individuals, at least, who maintained that a satisfactory synthesis of the two is possi- ble. Sometimes philosophers, like Plato and Hegel, have attempted to construct vast conceptual...
Show moreoy On Religion and Modern Science: A Linguistic Approach * October 1984, continued There have generally been individuals, at least, who maintained that a satisfactory synthesis of the two is possi- ble. Sometimes philosophers, like Plato and Hegel, have attempted to construct vast conceptual systems that could include both spiritual and mundane concerns in one comprehensive intellectual whole. At other times the attempted synthesis has had a less metaphysical character and more of an existential one, viewing both spiritual and mundane concerns as essential to a satisfactory philosophy of life. In either case, considerable effort is made to show that science and religion do not exclude each other; that, in fact, either without the other is in some sense incomplete. One problem which should be recognized at this point is that the terms "science" and "religion" are notoriously vague. For our purposes, however, we shall circumvent the problem by using these words in a very general way. We shall use "science" to refer to an attempt to accumulate systematized knowledge of reality, particularly with reference to general truths and the operation of general laws. It should be noted that this definition does not commit us to any particular conception of scientific method. Admittedly the term "science" has been much refined through reflection upon scientific methods, and we shall be concerned with at least some of these refine- ments later. We shall use the word "religion" to refer to some system of faith in and worship of God, a sufficiently broad meaning to include the many specific forms which these systems have taken. In one sense, this usage is too nar- row, for some views, such as Buddhism, which are usually termed religions do not involve worship of God. In some contexts, therefore, the expression "atheistic religion" is perfectly proper. This reservation need not concern us here, however, for the views we shall consider all operate more or less within the confines of the Judeo- Christian Conception. While the decision to define "religion" in this way does restrict the scope of this study, some restriction appears necessary to our problem to manageable size. There is considerable evidence that people in early societies regarded familiar and important objects such as the sun, moon, trees, weather, etc., as both elements of the natural world and somehow the repositories of a super- natural will that controlled their destinies in ways that they themselves could not. Fragments of early literature suggest that reality is somehow a unity, as though human lives were part and parcel of a grand cosmic scheme which, though they could not understand it, nevertheless provided some security not possible by means of what was then a very crude natural science. At the same time or a bit later, but still early in the history of Western thought, the suspicion began to grow that perhaps it was not necessary to go outside the universe for a principle or concept that would satisfactorily explain it. So, a form of Naturalism began to take hold. Suppose, that is, we could explain natural events in their own terms, without reference to the will or plan of God. In large measure, the history of the development of the natural sciences is the story of the development and elaboration of that single idea. It is a tale with many - turnings and numerous blind alleys, and we have neither time nor space to tell it all. But I think it helpful to trace some of the ideas that have had an influence on its development, partly because the story is fascinating in itself, but mainly because these ideas provide the warp and woof of current discussions of science and religion. The roots of Naturalism in our culture run deep. We can identify strains of that point of view as early as the pre- _ Socratic Greeks. According to fragmentary evidence that is available, Thales, a Greek philosopher of the sixth century B.C., taught that the basic element of the world, from which all other things were made, was water; and that through a process of rarefaction and condensation water becomes the sailing ships, sealing wax, cabbages and kings of our ordinary experience. Although that may seem a naive point of view, it is important here for two _ primary reasons. That Thales thought the basic element was water is not of intrinsic importance. He might as well have thought it to be air, as did Anaximenes, his contemporary, or the indefinable something termed "the Boundless," proposed by Anaximander. The important points are, first, that Thales proposed a natural answer, rather than one that was supernatural or religious. to the question of the ultimate essence of the world; and, sec- ond, that Thales' view implies that the world is an understandable entity, hence in principle controllable, rather _ than a mere theater in which the gods of the epics of Homer exercised their capricious wills. Thales seemed to .. .continued 137
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om On Religion and Modern Science: A Linguistic Approach * October 1984, continued = see that the order in nature is considerably more impressive than the chaotic and the irregular, and he chose to attempt to understand that order in natural terms. These considerations are important because, at...
Show moreom On Religion and Modern Science: A Linguistic Approach * October 1984, continued = see that the order in nature is considerably more impressive than the chaotic and the irregular, and he chose to attempt to understand that order in natural terms. These considerations are important because, at its center, sci- ence is not a method or a subject matter but an attitude: the belief that the world is understandable by human thought and that one need not leave the world to find principles to explain it. Thales' hypothesis seems in principle to be testable, for I suppose one could observe the behavior of water under all sorts of controlled conditions to see whether it was possible to transform it into sealing wax or other sub- stances. We would not be likely to bother, however, for it is difficult to imagine how water, having wetness as one of its properties, could be transformed into dry sand, having just the contrary property. It may be that the fundamental problem is more logical than empirical. But Thales' proposal does serve to point up one of the basic distinctions made by traditional philosophy and science, between the real nature of an object and its appearance. Might it be that the real nature of things is hidden from us, and that all that we can see, touch or measure is sur- face appearance? Another ancient Greek, Democritus, suggested just that possibility. He noticed, as we often do, that the appear- ances of things change according to the conditions under which they are perceived. For example, a rock on the seashore often appears one color at dawn, another at midday, and yet another in the red light of sunset. It does not seem reasonable to suppose that the rock itself changes as the conditions under which it is seen change. Surely if the same object appears at one time red, at another time gray; or if, at the same time it appears red to one observer and gray to another; then the color cannot really belong to the rock itself. Clearly it would be con- tradictory to suppose that the same object, in the same respect and at the same time, is both red and not-red. The conclusion that the color cannot really belong to the object itself is based on the assumption that the true nature of anything is inherent in itself, and that any quality of the object that seems to be dependent on the conditions under which it is seen or otherwise sensed, is not really a quality of the thing at all, but mere appearance. This suggestion of Democritus, that the nature of an object does not necessarily correspond to the way it is experi- enced by us, was an extremely important development in our thought about the natural world. It opens the pos- sibility that the real world may be very different from the ways in which we experience it. The Atomism of Democritus was a remarkable proposal. It gave added impetus to Thales’ suggestion that the universe can be explained without reference to any agency outside of it, and it implied that the fundamental nature of things may be quite different from our common-sense way of looking at them. Atoms, being too small to be seen or otherwise sensed, perhaps can be dealt with only arithmetically, by counting, or geometrically, by noting their various configurations into pencils and notepads. Furthermore, if Atomism is really fundamental, then it may change our way of thinking about God, too, if he is to have a place in the universe. God's nature is to be explained in the same manner as is that of anything else, namely by atoms in motion. it is easy to see, then, that if Naturalism is taken seriously. its effect on our ways of thinking is far reaching indeed. Epicurus is sup- posed to have remarked that the chief value of atomistic physics lies in that it rids people of their two chief wor- ries, namely fear of death and of divine intervention in the natural processes of the world. In later centuries, the mechanistic conception of reality received a major boost in the work of Newton, principally, yet in Democritus’ view we find at least the basic principles of a mechanistic conception of reality. The world of sensible objects as we know them is reducible to mechanical combinations of eternal atoms, free of the designs or purposes of either gods or men. While today's physical science has moved a good distance away from such a thoroughly mechanis- tic view of reality, I suspect that it remains the dominant conception of lay people. Enough has been said to suggest that a thorough-going Naturalism can be seen to be at odds with a religious conception of the universe. So it was seen to be for many centuries after Democritus, in spite of the efforts of apologists such as René Descartes to make room for both. In our present context there are two basic reasons for dissatisfaction with a view like that of Democritus and Newton-quite apart from the fact that in later centuries people came to find that it suggests a program that cannot be carried out. One is that mechanism leaves no room in the world for values and for God; the other is that it takes no account of ends or purposes. I will speak later of the decline of Newtonian mechanism in our century, but for the moment I want to turn to the views of Aristotle, whose physics is in direct opposition to the atomistic and mechanistic theory of Democritus and Newton. 138 .. .continued
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